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Abstract. In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching
problems where agents in one side of the market (hospitals) impose some
distributional constraints (e.g., a minimum quota for each hospital). We
show that when the preference of the hospitals is represented as an M\-
concave function, the following desirable properties hold: (i) the time
complexity of the generalized GS mechanism is O(jXj3), where jXj is
the number of possible contracts, (ii) the generalized Gale & Shapley
(GS) mechanism is strategyproof, (iii) the obtained matching is stable,
and (iv) the obtained matching is optimal for the agents in the other
side (doctors) within all stable matchings.
Furthermore, we clarify sucient conditions where the preference be-
comes an M\-concave function. These sucient conditions are general
enough so that they can cover most of existing works on strategyproof
mechanisms that can handle distributional constraints in many-to-one
matching problems. These conditions provide a recipe for non-experts in
matching theory or discrete convex analysis to develop desirable mecha-
nisms in such settings.
1 Introduction
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed, and it has
been applied to design clearinghouse mechanisms in various markets in practice.4
As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments,
however, researchers and practitioners have encountered various forms of distri-
butional constraints. As these features have been precluded from consideration
until recently, they pose new challenges for market designers.
The regional maximum quotas provide one such example. Under the regional
maximum quotas, each agent on one side of the market (which we call a hospital)
belongs to a region, and each region has an upper bound on the number of agents
4 See Roth and Sotomayor [15] for a comprehensive survey of many results in this
literature.
on the other side (who we call doctors) who can be matched in each region.
Regional maximum quotas exist in many markets in practice. A case in point is
Japan Residency Matching Program (JRMP), which organizes matching between
medical residents and hospitals in Japan. Although JRMP initially employed the
standard deferred acceptance algorithm [6], it was criticized as placing too many
doctors in urban areas and causing doctor shortage in rural areas. To address
this criticism, Japanese government now imposes a regional maximum quota
to each region of the country. Regulations that are mathematically isomorphic
to regional maximum quotas are utilized in various contexts, such as Chinese
graduate admission, Ukrainian college admission, Scottish probationary teacher
matching, among others [10].
Furthermore, there are many matching problems in which minimum quotas
are imposed. School districts may need at least a certain number of students
in each school in order for the school to operate, as in college admissions in
Hungary [1]. The cadet-branch matching program organized by United States
Military Academy (USMA) imposes minimum quotas on the number of cadets
who can be assigned to each branch [16]. Yet another type of constraints takes the
form of diversity constraints. Public schools are often required to satisfy balance
on the composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status [2].
Several mechanisms have been proposed [2, 3, 7, 8, 10] for each of these various
constraints, but previous studies have focused on tailoring mechanisms to specic
settings, rather than providing a general framework.
This paper develops a general framework for handling various distributional
constraints, in the setting of `matching-with-contracts' [9]. We begin by aggre-
gating hospital preferences and distributional constraints into a preference of
a representative agent, \the hospitals," as in [10]. The key of our analysis is
to associate the preference of the hospitals to a mathematical concept called
M\-concavity [11]. M\-concavity is an adaptation of concavity to functions on
discrete domains, and has been studied extensively in discrete convex analysis,
which is a branch of discrete mathematics. We show that if the hospitals' ag-
gregated preferences can be represented by an M\-concave function, then the
following key properties of two-sided matching hold: (i) the time complexity of
the generalized GS mechanism is O(jXj3), where jXj is the number of possible
contracts, (ii) the generalized GS mechanism is strategyproof for doctors, (iii) the
resulting matching is stable (in the sense of Hateld and Milgrom [9]), and (iv)
the obtained matching is optimal for each doctor among all stable matchings.
Although these properties can be obtained by combining already known re-
sults in matching theory and discrete convex analysis, these two research areas
have not been well-connected so far. While general frameworks on two-sided
matchings are proposed by utilizing discrete convex analysis in [4, 5], strate-
gyproof mechanisms are not considered in these models. One contribution of
this paper is to establish a link between matching theory and discrete convex
analysis.
Equipped with this general result, we study conditions under which the hos-
pitals' preferences can be represented by an M\-concave function. We start by
separating the preference of hospitals into two parts. More specically, we di-
vide hospital preferences to hard distributional constraints for the contracts to
be feasible, and soft preferences over a family of feasible contracts. Drawing upon
techniques from discrete convex analysis, we show that if a family of hospital-
feasible contracts forms a matroid [11], and the soft preferences satisfy certain
easy-to-verify conditions (e.g., it can be represented as a weighted sum of con-
tracts), then hospital preferences can be represented by an M\-concave function.
One of the main motivations of our work is to provide an easy-to-use recipe,
or a toolkit, for organizing matching mechanisms under constraints. Although
our general result is stated in terms of the abstract M\-concavity condition,
market designers do not need advanced knowledge on discrete convex analysis
or matching theory. On the contrary, our sucient conditions in the preceding
sections suce for most practical applications. To use our tool, all one needs to
show is that the given hard distributional constraints produce a matroid (note
that requirements over soft preferences are elementary, e.g., weighted sum of
contracts). Fortunately, there exists a vast literature on matroid theory, and
what kinds of constraints produce a matroid is well-understood. Therefore, it is
usually sucient to show that the hard distributional constraints can be mapped
into existing results in matroid theory. We conrm this fact by demonstrating
that most distributional constraints can be represented using our method. The
list of applications includes matching markets with the regional maximum quo-
tas [8, 10], individual minimum quotas [3], regional minimum quotas [7], and
diversity requirements in school choice [2]. As such, we believe that this study
contributes to the advance of practical market design (or \economic engineer-
ing") as emphasized in the recent literature (see Roth [14] for instance), by
providing tools for organizing matching clearinghouses in practice.
2 Model
A market is a tuple (D;H;X;D; f). D is a nite set of doctors and H is a nite
set of hospitals. X is a nite set of contracts. Each contract x 2 X is bilateral,
in the sense that x is associated with exactly one doctor xD 2 D and exactly
one hospital xH 2 H. Each contract can also contain some terms of contracts
such as working time and wages. Let D= (d)d2D, where each d represents
the preference of each doctor d over the contracts that are related to her (which
are denoted as Xd).
We assume some distributional constraints are enforced on feasible contracts.
We assume such distributional constraints and hospital preferences are aggre-
gated into a preference of a representative agent, which we call \hospitals".
The preference of the hospitals is represented as a function f , i.e., for two sets
of contracts X 0; X 00  X, the hospitals prefer X 0 over X 00 if f(X 0) > f(X 00)
holds. If X 0  X violates some distributional constraint, f(X 0) =  1. We as-
sume f is normalized by f(;) = 0. Also, we assume f is unique-selecting, i.e.,
8X 0  X; argmaxX00X0 f(X 00) is a singleton.
For notation simplicity, we assume each contract x 2 X is acceptable both for
doctors and hospitals. If a doctor (or hospitals) consider a contract unacceptable,
it is not included in X.
Now, we dene several concepts used in this paper.
Denition 1 (feasibility). For a subset of contracts X 0  X, we say X 0 is
hospital-feasible i f(X 0) 6=  1. Also, we say X 0 is doctor-feasible i it contains
at most one contract related to each doctor, i.e., jX 0dj  1 holds for all d 2 D.
Then, we say X 0 is feasible i it is doctor- and hospital-feasible. We also call a
feasible set of contracts matching.
Denition 2 (choice functions). For each doctor d, its choice function Chd(X
0)
chooses fxg, i.e., a set that contains exactly one contract x 2 X 0d, where x is
the most preferred contract in X 0d, or Chd(X
0) = ; if X 0d = ;. Then, the choice
function of all doctors are dened as ChD(X
0) :=
S
d2D Chd(X
0).
For the hospitals, its choice function ChH(X
0) is dened as: argmaxX00X0 f(X 00).
Since we assume f is unique-selecting, ChH is uniquely determined by f .
Denition 3 (stability [9]). We say a matching X 0 is stable i there exists
no x 2 X nX 0 such that x 2 ChH(X 0 [ fxg) and x 2 ChD(X 0 [ fxg) hold.
For notation simplicity, we write X 0 + x and X 0   x to represent X 0 [ fxg
and X 0 n fxg, respectively. Also, when x = ;, they mean that nothing is added
to X 0 and nothing is removed from X 0, respectively.
Denition 4 (M\-concavity). We say that f is M\-concave when 8Y; Z 
X;8y 2 Y n Z, there exists z 2 Z n Y [ f;g such that f(Y ) + f(Z)  f(Y   y +
z) + f(Z   z + y) holds.
The generalized Gale & Shapley (GS) mechanism [9] is a generalized version
of the well-known deferred acceptance algorithm [6], which is adapted for the
`matching-with-contracts' model.
Denition 5 (generalized Gale & Shapley (GS) mechanism [9]). The
generalized GS mechanism gives the following matching:
1. R ;.
2. X 0  ChD(X nR); X 00  ChH(X 0).
3. If X 0 = X 00 then return X 0, otherwise, R R [ (X 0 nX 00), goto 2.
3 Properties of generalized GS mechanism
In this section, we show properties of the generalized GS mechanism, assuming
f is M\-concave and unique-selecting. Due to space limitations, most of proofs
are deferred to Appendix.
Theorem 1. The time complexity of the generalized GS mechanism is O(jXj3).
The following theorem immediately follows from existing results in discrete
convex analysis.
Theorem 2. The generalized GS mechanism is strategyproof for doctors, i.e.,
no doctor has any incentive to misreport her preference, no matter what the
other doctors report. Also, it always produces a stable matching, and the obtained
matching is doctor-optimal among all stable matchings, i.e., all doctors weakly
prefer the obtained matching to any other stable matching.
4 Sucient Conditions for M\-concavity
In this section, we present several sucient conditions under which function f
becomes M\-concave. Without loss of generality, we can assume f is represented
by the summation of two parts, i.e., f(X 0) = ~f(X 0) + f^(X 0), where ~f rep-
resents hard distributional constraints for hospital-feasibility and f^ represents
soft preference over hospital-feasible contracts. More specically, ~f(X 0) returns
0 when X 0 is hospital-feasible, and otherwise,  1. f^(X 0) returns a bounded
non-negative value. Let us rst introduce a structure called matroid. [11].
Denition 6 (matroid). Let X be a nite set, and F be a family of subsets of
X. A pair (X;F ) is a matroid i it satises the following conditions.
1. ; 2 F .
2. If X 0 2 F and X 00  X 0, then X 00 2 F holds.
3. If X 0; X 00 2 F and jX 0j > jX 00j, then there exists x 2 X 0 n X 00 such that
X 00 [ fxg 2 F .
Let us denote a family of hospital-feasible contracts as dom f = dom ~f =
fX 0 j X 0  X; ~f(X 0) 6=  1g. The following theorem holds.
Theorem 3. If f is M\-concave and f(;) = 0, then (X; dom ~f) is a matroid.
Theorem 3 means that, in order to utilize the theory of M\-concavity, it is
necessary for the set of hospital-feasible contracts to form a matroid.
We utilize the following properties [11].
Property 1 (simultaneous exchange property). Let (X;F ) be a matroid. 8Y; Z 2
F; 8y 2 Y n Z, there exists z 2 Z n Y [ f;g such that Y   y + z 2 F and
Z   z + y 2 F hold.
Property 2 (summation with weights). If ~f(X 0) is M\-concave, then f(X 0) =
~f(X 0)+
P
x2X0 w(x) is also M
\-concave, where w(x) is a weight associated to x.
Property 3 (laminar concave function). Assume T is a laminar family of subsets
of X, i.e., for any Y; Z 2 T , either one of the following conditions holds: (i)
Y \Z = ;, (ii) Y  Z, or (iii) Z  Y . Also assume for each Y 2 T , a univariate
concave function fY is associated. Then, f(X
0) =
P
Y 2T fY (jX 0 \ Y j) is M\-
concave. Such an f is called a laminar concave function on T .
First, let us consider one simple but very general method for dening f^ .
Denition 7 (preference based on total order on X). Assume there exists
a total preference ordering H over X, i.e., x1 H x2 H x3 H : : :. Further-
more, we assume for each x, a positive weight w(x) is dened so that w(x) >
w(x0) holds when x H x0. Then, we assume f^(X 0) is given as
P
x2X0 w(x).
Theorem 4. If (X;F ), where F = dom ~f , is a matroid and f^(X 0) is given asP
x2X0 w(x), then f is M
\-concave.
Proof. From Property 1, it is clear that ~f is M\-concave. Then, from Property 2,
f(X 0) = ~f(X 0) +
P
x2X0 w(x) is M
\-concave.
It must be noted that although we assume a weight value w(x) is given for
each contract and f is dened by the sum of these weight values, ChH(X
0) is
determined only by the relative ordering of these weight values. Thus, the specic
cardinal choice of these weight values is not important.
Let us introduce a useful matroid and an M\-concave function based on it.
Theorem 5. Assume T is a laminar family of subsets of X, and positive inte-
gers qT for T 2 T are given. Then, (X;F ), where F = fX 0  X j jX 0 \ T j 
qT (8T 2 T )g, is a matroid. Furthermore, assume ~f is dened so that dom ~f = F ,
and f^ is a laminar concave function on T , then f is M\-concave.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from Property 3.
Let us introduce another type of useful M\-concave functions/matroids. We
rst introduce a concept called a group of contracts.
Denition 8 (group of contracts). Let G = fg1; : : : ; gng be a partition of X,
i.e., g \ g0 = ; for any g 6= g0 and Sg2G g = X. We call each element g as a
group in G.
A natural way of dividing contracts into groups is based on hospitals, i.e., each
gi represents the set of contracts related to hospital hi.
For contracts within each group g, we assume a priority ordering g is de-
ned. Furthermore, we assume a positive weight w(x) is dened for each x, so
that w(x) > w(x0) when both x and x0 belong to g and x g x0.
Furthermore, we assume a nite sequence of groups is dened, in which a
group can appear repeatedly. This sequence determines a preference over the
numbers of accepted contracts of each group. Such a preference is called an order-
respecting preference, which can model a wide variety of preferences of hospi-
tals [10]. For example, a sequence g1; g1; g2; g3; g1; g1; g2; g3; : : :means that, g1 can
accept two contracts, then g2 can take one, and g3 can take one, and so on, as long
as there exists a contract related to each group. If a sequence is dened based on
a round-robin ordering, e.g., it is given as g1; g2; : : : ; gn; g1; g2; : : : ; gn; g1; g2; : : :,
then it means that hospitals prefer that the numbers of accepted contracts of
each group become as equal as possible.
Then, let wg(i) denote the weight associated with the i-th selection/turn of
group g. We assume 8i; g; wg(i) > wg(i + 1) holds. Also, if the i-th appearance
of group g is earlier than the j-th appearance of group g0 in the sequence, we
assume wg(i) > wg0(j) holds. Thus, these weights represent the sequence. We
call these weights group weights. Let us dene Wg(k) :=
Pk
i=1 wg(i).
Denition 9 (order-respecting preference). For groups G, an order-respecting
preference f^ is given as follows:
f^(X 0) =
X
g2G
Wg(jX 0 \ gj) +
X
x2X0
w(x); (1)
where wg(i) >> w(x) holds for any g; i, and x.
Now, we clarify the condition on ~f , such that f(X 0) = ~f(X 0)+f^(X 0) becomes
M\-concave, assuming f^(X 0) is order-respecting.
Denition 10 (symmetry of groups). We say G is symmetric in (X;F ), if
for a matroid (X;F ), 8g 2 G;8x; x0 2 g; 8X 0  X such that fx; x0g \ X 0 = ;,
X 0 + x 2 F i X 0 + x0 2 F holds.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 6. f(X 0) = ~f(X 0)+f^(X 0) is M\-concave if (X;F ), where F = dom ~f ,
is a matroid, G is symmetric in (X;F ), and f^ is order-respecting.
Let us introduce a few matroids and a method to create a new matroid from
given matroids [13], which are used in our case studies.
Denition 11 (uniform matroid). (X;F ) is a uniform matroid if F = fX 0jX 0 
X; jX 0j  kg for some non-negative integer k.
Denition 12 (gammoid). A gammoid (X;F ) is dened based on a directed
graph (V;E; S; T ). Here, V is a set of vertexes, and E is a set of directed edges.
We assume S  V , T  V , and S\T = ;. Here, S is a set of start vertexes and
T is a set of terminal vertexes. We assume S = X, and X 0  X is an element
of F , i there exist vertex-disjoint paths for each x 2 X 0 to some element in T .
Denition 13 (union). Assume (X;F1); : : : ; (X;Fk) are matroids. Then (X;F ),
where F = fX 0jX 0 = S1ikX 0i; where X 0i 2 Fig is also a matroid.
5 Case Studies
In this section, we examine existing works on constrained matching and show
that the sucient conditions described in Section 4 hold in these cases.
5.1 Standard Model
In the standard model of two-sided matching [6], a contract x 2 X is a pair (d; h),
which represents a matching between doctor d and hospital h. Each hospital h
has its maximum quota qh, i.e., X
0 is hospital-feasible i jX 0hj  qh for all h,
where X 0h = f(d; h) 2 X 0 j d 2 Dg. (X;F ), where F = dom ~f , is a matroid, since
it is a union of uniform matroids.
Each hospital h has a priority ordering h among contracts Xh. Let us
assume a positive weight w(x) is dened for each x = (d; h), so that w((d; h)) >
w((d0; h)) when (d; h) h (d0; h) holds. Assuming f^(X 0) =
P
x2X0 w(x), f is
M\-concave by Theorem 4. It must be noted that although we assume a weight
value w(x) is given for each contract and f is dened by the sum of these weight
values, ChH(X
0) is determined only by the relative ordering of these weight
values among the contracts that belongs to the same hospital. Thus, the specic
cardinal choice of these weight values, or the relative ordering among contracts
for dierent hospitals, is not important.
In the standard model, a matching is stable i there exists no blocking pair [6].
Here, we assume each hospital has its own choice function Chh, and ChH(X
0)
is given as
S
h2H Chh(X
0). X 0 is stable if there exists no pair of d and h, where
x 2 X n X 0 is a contract related to d and h, x 2 Chh(X 0 [ fxg) and x 2
Chd(X
0 [ fxg) hold. It is easy to see that our stability is equivalent to standard
stability, and the standard deferred acceptance mechanism is identical to the
generalized GS-mechanism where ChH is dened as the maximization of this f .
However, if some additional distributional constraints are imposed, ChH can-
not be dened in this way. Thus, our stability can be dierent from standard
stability. It is common that no matching satises standard stability when addi-
tional distributional constraints are imposed.
5.2 Regional Maximum Quotas [8, 10]
The model used in [8, 10] is almost identical to the standard model. The only
dierence is that hospitals are grouped into regions R = fr1; : : : ; rlg, where
each region r is a subset of hospitals, and has its regional maximum quota qr.
We assume R is a laminar family of H, i.e., these regions have a hierarchical
structure. Let X 0r denote
S
h2rX
0
h. X
0 is hospital-feasible i jX 0hj  qh for all
h 2 H, and jX 0rj  qr for all r 2 R. From Theorem 5, (X;F ), where F = dom ~f ,
is a matroid, since T = fXr1 ; Xr2 ; : : : ; Xh1 ; Xh2 ; : : :g is a laminar family of X.
Goto et al. [8] assume there exists a total preference ordering H over X,
i.e., x1 H x2 H x3 H : : :. We assume a positive weight w(x) for each x is
dened so that w(x) > w(x0) when x H x0. Let us assume f^(X 0) is given asP
x2X w(x). Then, f is M
\-concave by Theorem 4. In Goto et al. [8], a mechanism
called Priority-List based Deferred Acceptance mechanism (PLDA) is presented.
PLDA is identical to the generalized GS mechanism where ChH is dened as
the maximization of this f .
In Kamada and Kojima [10], a round-robin ordering among hospitals is de-
ned, e.g., h1 ! h2 ! : : :, and each hospital can sequentially accept one contract
according to this round-robin ordering.5 Let whi(j) denote the weight associated
with the j-th choice of hospital hi. Then, we can dene whi(j) as C   jHj  j  i,
where C is a large positive constant. Wh(k) denotes
Pk
j=1 wh(j). Then, f^(X
0)
can be dened as
P
h2H Wh(jXhj) +
P
x2X0 w(x), where C >> w(x) for all
x 2 X. Assuming G = fXh1 ; Xh2 ; : : :g, it is clear that G is symmetric in (X;F ).
Thus, from Theorem 6, f(X 0) = ~f(X 0) + f^(X 0) is M\-concave. In Kamada
and Kojima [10], a mechanism called Flexible Deferred Acceptance mechanism
(FDA) is presented. FDA is identical to the generalized GS mechanism where
ChH is dened as the maximization of this f .
5.3 Regional Minimum Quotas [7]
The model used in [7] is almost identical to the regional maximum quotas model
described in Section 5.2, but each individual hospital h has its minimum quota
ph. Furthermore, each region r has its minimum quota pr rather than its maxi-
mum quota. The model presented in [3] is a special case of this model in which
no regional minimum quota is imposed.
X 0 is (original) hospital-feasible i ph  jX 0hj  qh for all h, and pr  jX 0rj
for all r. Here, we assume each doctor can accept any hospital, and each hospital
can accept any doctor, i.e., 8d 2 D; 8h 2 H; (d; h) 2 X. For each region r, let
qr denote
P
h2r qh. Without loss of generality, we assume there exists a root
region H, whose minimum quota is set as pH = n (and qH =
P
h2H qh). From
these assumptions, regions R and individual hospitals form a tree, in which
H is the root node (as shown in Figure 1 (a)). We assume for each region r,P
h2r ph  pr  qr holds. From these assumptions, we can guarantee that a
feasible matching always exists.
If we use the original denition of hospital-feasibility, the family of hospital-
feasible contracts cannot be a matroid, since ; is not hospital-feasible. Here, we
relax the original hospital-feasibility as follows. X 0 is hospital-feasible i there
exists X 00  X 0 such that X 00 is original hospital-feasible.
We create a gammoid that represents these regional constraints as follows.
{ We set the start vertexes S as X.
{ For each hospital h, we create ph terminal vertexes and qh ph intermediate
vertexes. There exist links from each (d; h) to these vertexes.
{ For each region r, we create pr  
P
h2r ph terminal vertexes. There exist
links from intermediate vertexes created for h 2 r to these vertexes.
{ We assume ~f(X 0) = 0 i there exist vertex-disjoint paths from each x 2 X 0
to some terminal vertex, and otherwise,  1.
Assume there are four hospitals h1; : : : ; h4. Their maximum and minimum quotas
are 3 and 1, respectively. They are divided into two regions r1; r2. Their minimum
quotas are 3 (Figure 1 (a)). Thus, we require at least one doctor is assigned to
5 To be more precise, Kamada and Kojima [10] assume target quotas for each hospital
can be introduced. Here, we consider a case where these target quotas are the same
for all hospitals that belongs to the same region.
h1 h3 h4h2
p: 8
q: 3
p: 1
p: 3p: 3
X
(d1, h1)
r1 r2
H h1
(d2, h1)
h1 h1
r1
terminal vertexes
…
…
H H
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Example of Gammoid
both h1 and h2, and additional one doctor is assigned to either h1 or h2. Then,
for h1, we create one terminal vertex, and 3 1 = 2 intermediate vertexes. There
exist links from each contract related to h1 to these vertexes. Also, for r1, we
create 3 (1+1) = 1 terminal vertex. There exist links from intermediate vertexes
for h1 (as well as h2) to these vertexes. For group H, we create 8  (3 + 3) = 2
terminal vertexes. There exist links from intermediate vertexes for h1 (as well as
h2; h3, and h4) to these vertexes (Figure 1 (b)). The following theorem holds.
Theorem 7. X 0 is hospital-feasible, i.e., there exists X 00  X 0 such that X 00 is
original hospital-feasible, i ~f(X 0) = 0.
f^(X 0) is dened in a similar way as in Section 5.2. Then, f becomes M\-concave
from Theorem 6.
Goto et al. [7] present a mechanism based on the deferred acceptance mecha-
nism called Round-robin Selection Deferred Acceptance mechanism for Regional
Minimum quotas (RSDA-RQ). RSDA-RQ is identical to the generalized GS
mechanism where ChH is dened as the maximization of f described above. Fra-
giadakis et al. [3] present a mechanism based on the deferred acceptance mech-
anism called Extended Seat Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ESDA). ESDA is
a special case of RSDA-RQ, in which no regional minimum quota is imposed.
5.4 Controlled School Choice [2]
We assume each doctor d has its type (d) 2 T = ft1; : : : ; tkg. A type of doctor
may represent race, income, gender, or any socioeconomic status. Each hospital h
has a priority ordering h among contracts Xh. Furthermore, each hospital sets
minimum and maximum quotas for each type t, which are denoted as q
h;t
and
qh;t, respectively. These quotas are soft-bounds and does not aect feasibility.
Let us assume a contract is represented as (d; h; t; s), where t 2 T and s 2
f0; 1; 2g. s = 0; 1; 2 mean that doctor d is accepted for hospital h for type t's
priority seat, normal seat, and extended seat, respectively. Let X 0h;t;s denote
f(d; h; t; s) 2 X 0 j d 2 Dg. Let us assume for each x, its weight w(x) is dened.
We assume w((d; h; t; 0)) > w((d0; h0; t0; 1)) and w((d; h; t; 1)) > w((d0; h0; t0; 2))
hold for any d; d0; t, and t0, i.e., hospitals rst try to ll their priority seats,
then normal seats, and nally extended seats. Also, we assume w((d; h; t; s)) >
w((d0; h; t; s)) if d h d0, i.e., the preference of an individual hospital over doctors
is respected, as long as doctors have the same type.
Let us dene ~f(X 0) as 0 when jX 0hj  qh, jX 0h;t;0j  qh;t, and jX 0h;t;1j 
qh;t   qh;t hold 8h 2 H, 8t 2 T , and  1 otherwise. Also, let us dene f^(X 0) asP
x2X0 w(x). From Theorem 5, ~f(X
0) forms a matroid, since T = fXh;t;sjh 2
H; t 2 T; s 2 f0; 1; 2gg [ fXhjh 2 Hg is a laminar family of X. Thus, f is
M\-concave from Theorem 4.
To run the generalized GS mechanism, we modify the preference of each
doctor d so that (d; h; t; s) d (d; h0; t; s0) holds for any h 6= h0, s, and s0 if
h d h0, and (d; h; t; 0) d (d; h; t; 1) d (d; h; t; 2) holds for any h. Ehlers et al.
[2] present a mechanism based on the deferred acceptance mechanism called
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Soft Bounds (DAASB). DAASB is identical
to the generalized GS mechanism where ChH is dened as the maximization of
f . Ehlers et al. [2] also introduce a new stability concept, in which doctor d and
hospital h can form a blocking pair, where d is currently assigned to hospital h0,
h d h0, and (d) = t, if either one of the following conditions holds:
1. jX 0hj < qh or jX 0h;t;0j < qh;t, or
2. another doctor d0, where (d0) = t0 is assigned to h, and either
(a) t = t0 and d h d0,
(b) t 6= t0, q
h;t
 jX 0h;tj < qh;t, qh;t0 < jX 0h;t0 j  qh;t0 , and d h d0,
(c) t 6= t0. q
h;t
 jX 0h;tj < qh;t, and jX 0h;t0 j > qh;t0 , or
(d) t 6= t0, jX 0h;tj  qh;t, jX 0h;t0 j > qh;t0 , and d h d0 holds.
This stability concept is identical to our stability.
6 Conclusion
We proved that in two-sided, many-to-one matching problem, in which some
distributional constraints are imposed on feasible matchings, several desirable
properties hold when the preference of hospitals is represented as an M\-concave
function. Furthermore, we derived sucient conditions under which the pref-
erence becomes an M\-concave function. These conditions provide a recipe for
non-experts of matching theory and discrete convex analysis to develop desir-
able mechanisms that handle many-to-one matching problems with distribu-
tional constraints.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In Denition 5, if X 0 = X 00, i.e., if no contract is rejected by hospitals, the
procedure terminates immediately. Thus, at least one contract must be rejected
in each execution of line 2. Thus, the generalized GS mechanism executes line 2
at most jX 0j times. The calculation of ChD is O(jX 0j). By Lemma 1, ChH(X 0)
can be calculated in O(jX 0j2). Thus, the time complexity of the generalized GS
mechanism is O(jXj3).
Lemma 1. ChH(X
0) can be calculated in O(jX 0j2).
Proof. The following greedy algorithm does this computation.
1. S  ;, U  X 0.
2. Repeat the following procedure.
Choose x 2 U so that f(S + x) is maximized and f(S + x) > f(S), and set
S to S + x and U to U n fxg. If no such x exists, return S.
We show the correctness of the algorithm. Assume that S = fs1; s2; : : : ; skg
denotes the output of the algorithm and its elements are added in ascending
order of index. We will use M-optimality theorem and M-minimizer cut theorem
(see [11] for details). In our context, M-minimizer cut theorem guarantees that
if x 2 X 0 maximizes f among x 2 X 0 and f(;) < f(x) then the maximizer
X 2 argmaxX00X0 f(X 00) must contain x. Thus, s1 must be contained in X.
By iteratively using M-minimizer cut theorem for fs1; : : : ; sig with i < k, we
can show that fs1; : : : ; si; si+1g  X, and nally, S  X. On the other hand,
f(S)  f(S+x) for all x 2 X 0 nS holds. These facts together with M-optimality
theorem which says
f( ~X)  f(X 00) (8X 00  X 0)()

f( ~X)  f( ~X + x  y) (8x; y 2 X 0)
f( ~X)  f( ~X  x) (8x; y 2 X 0);
imply S = X.
B Proof of Theorem 2
By Lemma 2, assuming f is M\-concave and unique-selecting, ChH satises
the irrelevance of rejected contracts, the substitute condition, and the law of
aggregate demand. Hateld and Milgrom [9] show that when ChH satises these
three conditions, the generalized GS mechanism is strategyproof for doctors, and
it obtains the doctor-optimal matching among all stable matchings.
Lemma 2. ChH(X
0) satises the following three properties.
Irrelevance of rejected contracts: for any X 0  X and any x 2 XnX 0, ChH(X 0) =
ChH(X
0 [ fxg) whenever x =2 ChH(X 0 [ fxg).
Substitutes condition: for any X 0; X 00  X with X 0  X 00, ReH(X 0)  ReH(X 00)
holds, where ReH(X
0) = (X 0 n ChH(X 0)).
Law of aggregate demand: for any X 0; X 00  X with X 0  X 00, jChH(X 0)j 
jChH(X 00)j.
Proof. Since ChH(X
0) is dened as argmaxX00X f(X 00) and f is unique-selecting,
it is clear that irrelevance of rejected contracts holds. Also, Fujishige and Tamura
[4] show that the substitutes condition holds if f is M\-concave and unique-
selecting. Furthermore, Murota and Yokoi [12] show that the law of aggregate
demand holds if f is M\-concave and unique-selecting.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Let  : ZN ! R[f 1g be an M\-concave function such that dom  is bounded
and has 0 as the minimum point. For each i 2 N , let ci = maxfz(i) j z 2 dom g
for all i 2 N . Let us consider a nite set X and a partition G = fg1; g2; : : : ; gng
of X with jgij  ci for all i 2 N . Let us dene (X 0) as (jX 0 \ g1j; : : : ; jX 0 \ gnj).
Each element i(X
0), where 1  i  n, is a non-negative integer. We dene the
family F of subsets of X dened by
F = fX 0  X j (X 0) 2 dom g:
Then, the following lemma holds. The denition of the symmetry is given in
Denition 10. This lemma is the converse of Lemma 4.
Lemma 3. (X;F ) is a matroid and G is symmetric in (X;F ).
Proof. The fact that G is symmetric in (X;F ) is obvious by the denition of F .
Since 0 2 dom , we have ; 2 F .
Let X 0; X 00 2 F with jX 0j > jX 00j. We denote (X 0) and (X 00) by z1 and
z2, respectively. It follows from jX 0j > jX 00j that there exists i 2 N with z1(i) >
z2(i). The M
\-concavity of  guarantees that (a) z1   i; z2 + i 2 dom  or (b)
there exists j 2 N such that z2(j) > z1(j) and z1 i+j ; z2+i j 2 dom ,
where i is a unit vector such that its i-th element is 1 and other elements are
0.
In the case (a), we have X 00 [ fxg 2 F for some x 2 gi \ (X 0 n X 00). In
the case (b), there exist x 2 gi \ (X 0 n X 00) and y 2 gj \ (X 00 n X 0) with
X^ 0 := X 0   fxg + fyg 2 F . We note that jX^ 0j = jX 0j and X 0 \X 00 is a proper
subset of X^ 0 \ X 00. We replace X 0 by X^ 0, and continue the above discussion.
After a nite number of iterations, the above (a) must occur by jX 0j > jX 00j.
From the above discussion, for X 00 = ; and x 2 X 0, we have X 0   fxg 2 F .
Hence, if X 00  X 0 2 F then X 00 2 F .
We nally prove Theorem 3. Suppose that X = fx1; x2; : : : ; xmg. Since f is
an M\-concave function on X and f(;) = 0, from Lemma 3 for the partition
G = ffx1g; fx2g; : : : ; fxmgg and X, we have F = fX 0 j X 0  X; f(X 0) 6=  1g
is a matroid.
D Proof of Theorem 6
Since G = fg1; : : : ; gng is symmetric in a matroid (X;F ), when we check whether
X 0 2 F , only the number of members for each group matters. Then, we can
assume ~f(X 0) is equal to ~((X 0)), where ~(z) is 0 if 9X 0 2 F such that z =
(X 0), and otherwise  1. Here, (X 0) is dened as (jX 0 \ g1j; : : : ; jX 0 \ gnj).
It is enough to show that the function f dened by f(X 0) = ((X 0)) =
~((X 0)) +
P
1inWgi(i(X
0)) is M\-concave, because f is equal to the sum of
f and a linear function.
We rst show that  is M\-concave.  is M\-concave when its eective domain
dom  = fzj(z) 6=  1g is not ; and for all z; z0 2 dom  and i 2 N with zi > z0i,
either (a) (z) + (z0)  (z   i) + (z0 + i) or (b) there exists j 2 N such
that z0j > zj and (z)+ (z
0)  (z i+j)+ (z0+i j), holds, where i
is a unit vector such that its i-th element is 1 and other elements are 0.
Lemma 4.  is M\-concave, and dom  has 0 as the minimum point.
Proof. Since ~f gives a matroid, dom  has 0 as the minimum point. It is known
that the sum of an M\-concave function and a separable concave function is
also M\-concave. Since  is the sum of ~ and the separable concave functionP
1inWgi(i(X
0)), it is enough to show that ~ is M\-concave. Furthermore,
since the value of ~ in its eective domain is always 0, to show the M\-concavity
of ~, it is sucient to show that dom ~ is M\-convex, i.e., for all z; z0 2 dom ~ and
i 2 N with zi > z0i, either (a) z i; z0+i 2 dom ~ or (b) there exists j 2 N such
that z0j > zj and z i+j ; z0+i j 2 dom ~, holds. Let X1; X2 be elements
of matroid (X;F ) such that z = (X1) and z
0 = (X2). By the symmetry of G
in (X;F ), we can assume that either X1 \ gk  X2 \ gk or X2 \ gk  X1 \ gk for
each k 2 N . By zi > z0i, there exists x 2 gi \ (X1 nX2). Simultaneous exchange
property for X1, X2 and x guarantees that (a') X1 x;X2+x 2 F or (b') there
exists y 2 (X2 nX1) with X1   x+ y;X2 + x  y 2 F . In the case (a'), we have
z   i = (X1   x) and z0 + i = (X2 + x), that is, (a) holds. In the case
(b'), y 62 gi must hold, and therefore, there exists j 2 N with y 2 gj . By our
assumption, jX1\gj j < jX2\ gj j must be satised. Thus, in this case, (b) holds.
Lemma 5. f is M\-concave.
Proof. Let X 0; X 00 2 dom f and x 2 X 0 n X 00. We assume that x 2 gi. We
denote (X 0) and (X 00) by z0 and z00, respectively. If jX 0 \ gij  jX 00 \ gij
then there exists y 2 gi \ (X 00 nX 0). By the symmetry between (X;F ) and G,
f(X 0) = f(X 0   x+ y) and f(X 00) = f(X 00 + x  y).
In the sequel, we suppose that jX 0 \ gij > jX 00 \ gij, i.e., z0i > z00i . The
M\-concavity of  guarantees that:
(i) (z0) + (z00)  (z0   i) + (z00 + i)
or
(ii) there exists j 2 N such that z00j > z0j and
(z0) + (z00)  (z0   i + j) + (z00 + i   j):
In the case (i), we have f(X 0) + f(X 00)  f(X 0   x) + f(X 00 + x). In the case
(ii), there exist y 2 gj \ (X 00 nX 0) such that
f(X 0) + f(X 00)  f(X 0   x+ y) + f(X 00 + x  y):
Hence f is M\-concave.
E Proof of Theorem 7
The number of terminal vertexes is (n  Pr2R pr) +Pr2R(pr  Ph2r ph) +P
h2H ph = n. Thus, at most n contracts are accepted. Assume X
0 is hospital-
feasible. For each hospital h, the total number of contracts are at most ph +
(qh ph) = qh. Thus, accepted contracts satisfy all individual maximum quotas.
Also, if one terminal vertex t is not connected to any contract in X 0, we can
nd x0 2 X n X 0 so that there exists a vertex disjoint path from x0 to t. By
adding new contracts, X 0 is extended to X 00 so that n contracts are accepted.
Then, each hospital accepts at least ph contracts. Also, each region accepts at
least pr contracts (i.e., ph contracts for each h 2 r, and pr  
P
h2r ph additional
contracts for the terminal vertexes for region r). Thus, X 00 satises all minimum
quotas and X 0 is a subset of (original) hospital-feasible matching.
